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ABSTRACT 
Anti-Eavesdropping Communication Layer to 
Protect against Traffic Analysis. (December 2002) 
Yiping Shen, B. S. , Southeast, University, China 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jyh-Cham Liu 
In this thesis, we present unicast and multicast protocols to resist eavesdropping 
and traffic profiling of group communications. At the application layer, we propose 
a secret-sharing approach for the exchange of shared keys. That is, multicast groups 
usc digital signatures to identify a specific secret-sharing rule, so that nodes in the 
same group can determine their session keys independently, After the initiation phase 
to establish group memberships and exchange shared key(s), communicating nodes 
fragment and shuffie messages into unicast or multicast packets to be transported 
along different paths. We propose two different transport layer primitives for packet 
delivery. In the breadth-first approach, packets carrying scattered message pieces are 
relayed in two stages across group members. For the depth-first approach, group 
members are configured into multiple rings, each of which is responsible for delivery 
of one packet to thc destination. In both cases, only nodes that have proper keys 
can decode them. To resist traffic profiling attacks, all nodes kccp thc inbound and 
outbound traffic volumes identical via mixed transport of real and decoy packets. 
Further protection can be added by making the group identifiers secret. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
With the broad application of electronic credentials over the Internet for various 
transaction activities, protection of such high value information becomes critical to the 
functionality and integrity of the electronic commerce. While cryptographic measures 
are adequate for most common applications, for highly sensitive applications, such 
as key management centers, it may also be necessary to conceal the network traffic 
patterns. Otherwise, the profile (volumes, peak times, etc. ) of the communication 
traffic may unveil the nature of certain activities, e. g. , a command center might be 
giving an order to its subordinate units. If eavesdroppcrs can predict presence of high 
value packets, such as key refreshing messages, they would have a much better chance 
in cracking the systems. 
In "Traffic Analysis: Protocols, Attacks, Design Issues and Open Problems" 
[I], Raymond presents the traffic analysis problem and expose the most important 
protocols, attacks and design iasues. Our main goal is to protect users against traffic 
analysis, especially in a critical group communication system. That is, we don' t 
want an adversary that can inonitor and/or corripromise certain parts of this group 
communication systein and be able to match a message sender with the recipient 
(sender-recipient matchings), 
A related problem is that of netv:ork unobservability which attempts to hide 
all communication pattern. (how many, at what time and to whom/from whom 
messages are sent and received). Notice that network unobservability implies thc 
ineffectivenes of traffic analysis. Whereas message privacy can be obtained using 
The journal model is IEEE Trairsactions ori Autvractic Couiroi. 
encryption, it is much harder to protect sender and/or recipient privacy; especially in 
large open networks. The number of different assumptions and settings is huge which 
makes it difficult, to define and reason about thc problem in a rigorous maniier. As 
with many constructions in cryptography, there are efficiency, practicality/security 
tradeoffs to be made. For exarriple, if efficiency and practicality were not issues, we 
could broadcast messages in order to protect rccipicnt privacy. 
Notice that the problem definition isn't entirely trivial. We can not provide 
pcrfcct privacy since the number of possible senders and recipients is bounded. So, 
for example, if there are only two parties on the network, an attacker having, access 
to this information can trivially determine who is communicating with whom. The 
best we can hope for is to make all possible sender-recipient matchings look equally 
likely. That is, the attacker's view's (by view, we mean all the information available 
to thc attacker) statistical distribution should be independent from the actual sender- 
recipient matchings. 
Unfortunately, until now there are still no satisfactory definitions or methods pro- 
viding a solid framework in which to protect against traffic analysis in current group 
communication systems. At the time of writing this paper, little study has been done 
on thc transport layer in order to protect group commuiiications from traffic analy- 
sis [2] [3]. Critical issues on how to secure group corrimunications have been widely 
studied in the literature. In the supporting layer, there arc numerous cryptographic 
techniques for handling group key management, such ss extended Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange [4], Chiou and Chen 's secure locks based on Chinese Remainder Theoreni [5] 
, secret sharing scheme [6] [7] [8] and key graphs [9] [10]. Moyer [11] proposed 
evaluation criteria about key management solutions. In application layer, Thomas 
[12], Butler [13] and Kcrbcros [14] described typical solutions for distributed au- 
thmitirity, and Nathalie [15] introduced thc sccurc anonymous group infrastructure. 
Reliable multicast (data dissemination) [16] sexvice such as Muse [17], IvIDP [18], 
RMTP [19], MFTP [20] have been proposed in order to support the transport layer. 
In this thesis, we propose data transport protocols by xvhich it becomes very 
dilficult, if not impossible, for eavesdkoppers to determine the interaction patterns in 
the group. At higher networking laycxs, a message is fxagmented, sliced, and then 
transported along different paths to reach its destination. By making the overall group 
traffic patterns unifoxrn and dispersed, our scheme drastically increases the network 
resources necessary for the eavesdroppers to acquire the message fragments, and crack 
the complete messages. Depth-first and breadth-first approaches are proposed here 
to provide different levels of protections, at different performance costs. 
CHAPTER H 
SYSTEM MODEL 
In this chapter, wc mainly introduce the system running environments. First, we will 
give the layered security requirement of the whole communication system. Then we 
will describe the system components and general operations under two types anti- 
eavesdropping broadcast algorithms, which we will introduce in next chapter. Based 
on the system model, we will describe two anti-eavesdropping broadcast algorithnrs 
and give cost and security analysis from adversary point of view in next chapter. 
A. Layered Security Requirement 
In this section, we investigate basic issues on how to create private group communi- 
cations without unveiling their traffic patterns, based on the four layers of security 
requirements listed in Figure 1. At the application level, we assume that some ex- 
isting solutions take care of user authentication snd anonymity. The credential of 
a principal, i. e. 
, 
a user or nzachinc, is bound to a public key through a public kcy 
infrastructure (PKI), such as X. 509 or PGP. We assume that the trusted entities 
set guidelines, certify new principals, snd validate the binding process, in addition 
to other operational details. We note that thc authentication authority docs not 
necessarily have the secrets for operations. 
Mcssagc encryption techniques such as IDEA, DES, RSA, or elliptic curve al- 
gorithms provide confidentiality and integrity of the payload at the message level. 
As for group key distribution snd exchange at the supporting level, we assume the 
use of a secret sharing sclreme like that of Shamir (6) and Blakley [7j, so that s 
recipient can recover thc mcssagc when k-out-of-a of the shares or shadorvs, become 
Application layer (authentication, anonymity, anti- 
collusion) 
Session layer (confidentiality, integrity, authenticity) 
Transport layer (anti-traffic analysis) 
supporting layer 
(group key 
management) 
Fig. 1. Security requirements of thc anti-cavcsdropping group cominunication 
available. Different choices for the values of k and n reflect the tradeoff between 
security and reliability. Although we choose the secret shanng scheme here to im- 
plement key distribution, it docs not prccludc us from using other tcchniqucs, c. g. , 
extended Diffie-HeHman key exchange [4], Chiou and Chen 's secure locks based on 
Chinese Remainder Theorem [5], and key graphs [9] [10] to manage group keys. 
For the transport level security designs, we are mainly focused on preventing traffic 
profiling and eavesdropping. By unifying the communication patterns for the four 
types of node interactive patterns, namely, point-to-point (1 — 1), point-to-multipoint 
broadcast (1 — N), multipoint-to-point (N — 1) and multipoint-to-niultipoint broad- 
cast (N — N), our scheine makes it very difficult to deterinine the interactions among 
the group members. By scattering a message into pieces for transport along different 
paths, we make it, very difficult to intercept the complete message. 
B. Components and Operations Assumptions 
We do not consider any type of node and link failures and assume that the low level 
networking protocols will maintain the connectivity between group-members at all 
time. As a result, at the application aud session layers, our model assumes a fully 
connected logical topology in which group iiieinbers are able to commuiiicate with 
one another via equally wcightcd paths. No specific requireriients on ordering and 
application 
layer 
transport 
layer 
authentication, 
group key establishment 
Slicing and dicing of 
packets 
AEB transport primitives 
(Breadth first & depth 
first transports) 
receiving & decoding of 
fragments 
Group 
initilization 
Operational 
phase 
Fig. 2. Main components of the anti-cavcsdropping broadcast algorithms 
queuing delays of packets are needed for group members and intermediate nodes to 
deliver packets. For simplicity, we assume that all control and data packets have the 
same size. 
Group communication activities in the proposed anti-eavesdropping broadcast 
(AEB) scheme are divided into thc initialization phase, and the operational phase, 
scc Figure 2. The initialization phase is aimed at establishing thc group mcmbcrship 
and other related administrative matters. Group members exchange node identifrers 
and key information. In a group shared key generation procedure, group members 
also authenticate each other based on a hierarchical or distributed framework. VVc 
make use of this authenticated key to identify and communicate with trusted entities 
to add an additional layer of protection during the operational phase. Ave note that in 
this phase the traffic patterns between group members are subject to passive analysis. 
At successful completion of the initialization phase, all members are authorized and 
authenticated for group interactions during the operational phase. 
CHAPTER. III 
ANTI-EAVESDROPPING BROADCASTING PROTOCOLS 
The operational phase of AEB consists of two main parts. First, data is shuffied, frag- 
mented and transported along different paths using AEB packet, transport primitives. 
A set of communication primitives is dcsigncd for dispersing the interaction patterns 
between nodes, and for making the traffic volumes in sll group members symmetric, 
asymptotically all nodes would have the same traffic patterns. As needed, the payload 
contents can be encrypted for further protection. 
A. Application Layer 
Our group communication eznploys trust relationship among group members as mod- 
elled in the Figure 3 below. One or many of these participating nodes are sources and 
sinks of message exchanges that automatically assurnc lcadcrship in defining shuffiing 
rules, message fragmentation and group dispersion snd interaction patterns. Trusted 
participating nodes are always active and own a shared group communicatiou key. 
Trusted forwarding nodes are active in assisting group participating nodes to con- 
ceal traffic patterns by exchanging true and decoy messages. Intermediate nodes do 
not participate in group shared key generation, key restoration, key revocation or 
fina message decryption. Finallv, thc cavcsdropping nodes are not trusted and never 
possess a shared key. 
The three main operations at the applicatiou layer include shared key exchanges, 
packet shuffiing and segmentation (at ihe senders), and reassembly of the scg'menta- 
tion (at the recipients). We describe these three functions in this subsection. 
When a node, for example, a broadcast server S, needs to broadcast a secret 
Group Leader 
Group members 
Trusted/Authenticated/ 
~ Active/Possesssed Shared 
Key/Sends and Receives 
message 
Intermediate/Forwarding 
Nodes 
Eavesdropper Nodes 
O Trusted/May not be Authenticated/Acnve/No shared key 
No Trusted/No 
Authenticated/Passive/No 
shared key 
Pig. 3. Levels of node functionality and trustworthiness communication 
message M to n nodes, A = An A2, . . . , A„, which can be the whole group, or a 
subgroup within thc group. To distribute a key, which is bound to a shared secret 
among the n nodes, S first sends out thc digital signature of a secret-sharing rulc, 
so that only the n selected nodes can determine the session key. Other nodes not 
belonging to this particular subgroup should only relay packets according to i, he 
packet headers. Thc algorithm is described next. 
1. Group Kcy Generation and Croup Management, 
Group Kcy Gcncration Algorithms using secret shanng scheme: 
~ Input:G, n; 
~ Output:K; 
~ K = F(X, n); 
1. S randomly selects a bulk of random data, X and partitions it into n fragments 
Gr, Gs, -. , G„. 
2. S calculates their MD5 digital digests I21] D, = H(G, ), i = 1, 2, n. 
3. S uses a secret, sharing scheme (k, n) [6] with Dr. . . , D„ss inputs. , and the 
shared kev is K. 
4. S sends its time-stamp to synchronize all recipients' clocks and initialize broad- 
cast channels. Recipients update local time-stamps and acknowledge S. 
5. Transfers G, to A, using an n-complete bipartite matching graph, i, j = 1, . . . , n. 
G, is transmitted in packets G„, . . . , G, „. A full handshaking procedure is used 
to make sure that all recipients get the packets. 
6. After S receives all the acknowledgements, it commands all recipients to start 
broadcast; A; broadcasts G, to A, (j = 1, 2, . . . , n, j Pi). 
7. After A, received from all other n — 1 nods, it repeats steps 2 and 3 to get the 
shared kcy K, K = F(X, n). 
After each A, recovers K, S can send out messages to members in A encrypted 
by K. Comparing with other group key distribution schemes I4] I5] I9] I10] I22] I23], 
our algorithm takes advantage of thc property of the secret sharing scheme [6] to 
distrrbute kcy-related materials among group members with a balanced traffic pattern. 
One could increase the protection by repeating the above algorithm a few times to 
derive the real K. 
When an existing member. departs from the group, all the shared secrets of 
this group need be discarderl. A simplesi, resolution is that we restart a nerv group 
v. ithout including thc departing mmrrber. The other case is related to addition of 
10 
a new member. Assuming that the new member is authenticated, we must. pass 
the existing set of shared secrets to thc new member. This can be doxie using a 
simple clieiit-server protocol as follows. Let W denote the new perspective inember, 
which now has a piece of authenticatiori credential from the PKI. W broadcasts the 
joint-group request including the PKI-credential. When any of the legitimate group 
members reccivcs thc request, it responds to the new node directly. 
To prove to W that it is a legitimate member of the group, each of the group 
members must own an "evidence function", which can produce an "authentic re- 
sponse" each time when they receive a request. In the simplest forin, the authentic 
response of a responding node can be its own PKI-credential. After W receives one 
or more authentic responses, it makes a connection request to one responding group 
member R, and ignores others. After mutual authentication and exchange of a session 
key K [24], R can pass all the necessary information to W using K . From this point 
on, if the secret sharing scheme needs to be updated due to addition of W, R just 
nccds to use the existing secret sharing scheme to inform others that W has been 
successfully added to the group. Other group members will need to update all the 
related computing and communicating processes to accommodate the new node W. 
2. Dispersed Broadcast 
Conceptually, in our approach we disperse a message along different paths for trans- 
port to avoid a single poirit of eavesdropping. Given that nodes in a group can receive 
their shared secrets (e. g. session keys), one can use broadcast packets to send unicast 
and multicast messages but only key owners can decipher the packets correctly. To 
disperse the traffic patterns among nodes, we usc a shuffiing and fragmentation tech- 
nique to randomize the transmission paths of packets of a message. For simplicity, 
11 
hl h2 h3 h4 
tbztbzH14444 Ib+bzHz4444 Ib+bzH44H44 
I 
H44H4k44H44 
IbzH4+bztbz ItzH11H44H1z H1zlbzlb4Hzz HzS444Hzzlbz 
hl h2 h3 h4 
I++4Wzhb4 Hz1Ibk44H14 Ib1IbS44W4 H4+bS44ktg 
IbzH14H44Hzz Ibzhb1H44Ibz Ib4H14Ibztb4 Ibktkbkiz 
Fig. 4. An example of the douhle shuffling and slicing of packets in two different ways 
we use the perfect shuffling rule to demonstrate the shufffing procedure. 
Before we broadcast a message M, we encrypt M using K and shufBe the en- 
crypted message. Suppose H = EK(M) and we use s, shufffingrule R = (r, , . . . , r„n), 
in which positioni is mapped lo r„ to shuffle the message fragments H(hn hz, . . . , h„), 
and hz(h„, hz„. . . , hs„). The following figure depicts the shuffling rule (3142) for map- 
ping of H and h, 1yi. l. et the shuffling outputs be dcnotcd as V(un uz, zzs, . . . , u„), we 
send V, to A, respectively (i — 1, 2, . . . , n). 1 igure 4 shows that one can put pieces of 
one fragment into one packet, or pieces from different fragments into one packet. 
ShufBing rules can be secretly exchanged in a process sirrzilar to that of the 
shared kcy exchanges. After a node obtains K and R, it will bc able to reconstruct 
the message M according the shuffling rule. The example shown in I'igure 5 illustrates 
our scheme. Here, we have Az, Az, As, and A4 in the same group. M is fragmented 
into Gz, G, , Gs, and G4. After S sets up group key K with Ar. , Az, As, and A, , it 
begins to transfer message fragments to Az, Az, As, and A4. For Ar to recover the 
message, Az, As, and A4 need to forward their fragnzents to A, . Ar then uses the R 
F'ig. 5. An example of two-hop relay of message fragments from node S to node Ar 
and K to reassemble the fragments in sequence. To break a communication message 
from S to Ar, an eavesdropper needs to intercept and decode Eq(Gr), Es(Gs), Eq(Gs), 
and Eq(G4), the encryption key K, and the shuffiing rule R, failing of any of the steps 
will not unveil thc plaintext mcssagc. 
B. Transport Layer 
To prevent traffic analysis attacks, our approach is to map all unicast/multicast mes- 
sages into broadcast packets, but only nodes that have the proper session keys can 
decode the packets into meaningful plaintext messages. We propose two different ap- 
proaches for the transport layer. The first is a breadth-first approach, and the second 
is a depth-first. In the breadth-first approach, the source fragments and disperses 
pieces of the message to group nodes. Intermediate nodes after receiving the "data, 
shares/shadows" relay them to the real destinations. Nodes maintain symmetric traf- 
fic by dispersing real and decoy packets to other nodes. For the depth first approach, 
group nodes are organized into multiple rings, so that data shares are transported 
along the rings to reach thc destinations. Similar to the breadth-first approach, all 
nodes keep track of the volumes of their inbound and outbound traffic balanced, so 
that all nodes appear to be symmetric to the eavesdroppers. 
1. Breadth-First Protocol 
The breadth-first procedure starts after cold-start initiation and group key exchanges 
are completed. Source S fragments and disperses messages to all participating nodes 
in the group with predetermined rules for distributing the fragmented messages. In 
thc subsequent phase, all intermediate nodes relay their fragments. An acknowledge- 
ment to each fragmented message (including the forwarded message) detects any loss 
and also serves to balance incoming traffic. 
Breadth-First Broadcast Transport Protocol: 
~ Summary: S fragments and disperses messages M (through broadcast) to n 
participating nodes A = Ar, Az, . . . , A„(possessing K) and m intermediate relay 
nodes. All nodes relay message fragments in turn to other nodes to reassemble 
in the second phase. 
~ Input: Message M and the shared key K. 
~ Output: All n participating nodes with K are able to decipher M. 
Algorithm Description at source S: 
1. Calculate complete message encipher Err(M)I. 
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2. Fragment Err(M) into P pieces, F(Err(M), n, m, P) = GnGz. . . . . , Gp. 
3. First stage relay, choose an arbitrary next hop A, . Choose a random G, axrd 
encrypt it using K. Transmit encrypted fragment, : S ~ A, . : Err(G;). 
4. S retransmits any lost packets, S ~ As: ACK(G, ), if no ACK received before 
time out. 
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 above for all fragments G, in Gr, Gz, . . . , Gr . 
6. If P ( n, there are still destinations that did not receive any fragments. Con- 
tinue the broadcast to reach the remaining destinations. 
7. S receives P acknowledgements from all destinations in step 6. 
Algorithm Description at receiving nodes A, : 
1. For each Err (G, ) received, send an acknowledgement to the sender: Ar ~ S 
ACK(G, ). 
2. Second stage relay, broadcast Err(G, ) to all Aa, Aq C A and k g i, Ai — + Aq 
Err(G, ) Vk ir= i and As E A, and send decoy to others. 
3. A, receives an acknowledgement of the receipt from all other nodes Aq and 
rctransmits if there are any losses during transmissions: A, ~ Aq: ACK(G, ). 
4. Node participating in shared group communication. If the number of fragments 
received (and buifered) match thc prcdctcrmined size (as distributed by original 
source), an attempt is macle to reorder and decrypt the fragments using the 
shared group key: Drr(Gr + Gz + . . + Gr ). Orrlering and validity of message is 
verified by successful decryptiorr of the complete message using K. 
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Fig. 6. Operations in a two-stage broadcast process 
The protocol opei. ations for the breadth-first approach are illustrated in Figure 
6. Thc figurc illustrates two-phase I-N unidirectional broadcast, process with source 
S and nodes Al, A2, A3 and A4 in a group cominunication. Shared group key and 
fragmentation rules are distributed before thc procedure starts and is intelligible only 
to valid destinations. 
In a single source 1 — iU broadcast framework, traffic is inade symmetric as the 
number of inbound and outbourid rnessagcs is made identical at all nodes. In ad- 
dition to achieving that, all niessages intended for specific destinatioii are mapped 
into broadcast packets, including thc acknowledgements, to conceal thc source and 
destination. Passive eavesdroppcrs need to know the phase sequence of our process, 
fragmentation and convergence process and the intended messages before completely 
making ini, elligible sense out of the fragments. Thc same framework functions for a 
point-to-point (I — 1) communication between any source S ancl destination. Only a 
single destination is able to order and decrypt messages using shared group key K. 
Broadcast environment with multiple sources, N — 1 and N — N. sre corrsidered as 
an extension of these basic. interaction patterns where a source broadcasts indepen- 
dent of other sources. The degree of protection provided by this scheme increases 
exponentially with the size of the broadcast group. Suppose that there are k nodes 
in the group, and the broadcast root S distributes secret information to n members. 
Even though we assume eavesdroppers know the entire topology, the possibility of 
the eavesdroppers to know the n group members is: Prob(G; ~Given n known nodes 
in the broadcast network of k nodes) 
The total number of packets on the wire across all broadcasts is proportional 
to the number of fragment pieces P. During first-relay process, the total number of 
messages on the wire is 2n if P & n and 2P, if P ) n. The number of inbound and 
outbound packets is conserved and decoy packets are sent to intermediate nodes if 
required. During the second-relay process, thc total number of packers on the wire is 
2n, as cithcr the node relays decoy packets (P ( n) or groups more than one message 
fragment in a single message (P ) n). The total messages across thc wire adding 
the two stages is then: MAX(2n, 2P) + 2n. Assuming all n nodes take part in the 
group broadcasting, each node owns a complete copy of the message by the end of 
the complete process. This results a total message fragment size of: P * n. 
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2. Permutation Ring Depth-First Protocol 
The basic idea of thc permutation ring approach is to organize a group of nodes 
into multiple logical rings, each of which reprcscnts a specific permutation rule for 
routing and/or shuffiing of fragments. For convenience, we adopt the notation of 
permutation for ring representation, called a permutation ring, which represents a 
logical interconnection path between group nodes. When S needs to send a message 
to node A;, it transmits s shufiled fragment along a randomly configured ring to reach 
A, . Unless an eavesdropper knows the shuffling rules R, it cannot decode the message. 
When S rcccives a fragmented packet along a particular ring, it knows thc fragment 
has been routed through a ring, and node A has received it. 
The transport, protocol is termed depth-first, owing to a full packet circulation 
along the ring regardless of the physical location of the destination in the ring. The 
basic operations of the permutation ring protocol are depicted as in Figure 7. In 
this example, S intends to send a message to As. The mcssagc is broken into four 
fragments Gr, Gz, Gs, and G4. The four encrypted fragments can be sent along four 
different rings to reach As. 
Based on the ownership of IC, a node on the ring can be either a session member, 
or merely a relay node of the session. It is easy to shoav that all the 1 — 1, 1 — N, N— 
1 and N — N interactions can be implemented using the permutation rings. The 
number of rings increases at s, factorial order resulting in a large search space for 
the eavesdroppers to crack the packets, not to mention our ability in smoothing the 
traffic, patterns between group members. 
A simple routing table could be used in each node to determine the next hop 
for each ring, given that the table size is reasonably small. Otherwise, ring identifier 
together with the current node identifie can uniquely be used to fiml the next hop. 
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Fig. 7. Illustration of depth-first permutation ring protocol 
Topology changes may be propagated across all nodes in two subsequent phases. In 
the first phase, only thc participating group communication nodes exchange authen- 
ticity and identification information and update the ring digest. Restoration phase 
establishes the identity of all nodes, and readjusts permutation sequences and ring 
digests for all participating iiodes. A smallest available node identifier (not used cur- 
rently) may be reused to save the search space. Dclction of a node results in the 
removal of the identifier to reflect in the calculation of ring digest. All shared secrets 
become voicl on deletion and other group members riced to reproduce the shared 
secrets. 
In thc second phase, the leader of tho mirrent ring (naturally thc source S), 
updates the intermediate (forwarding) nodes of the change in ring digest algorithm 
and addition of new identifier tags to the topology. Interrriediate (forwaiding) nodes 
are trusted but do not take part in restoration phase unlike participating group nodes. 
Source S acts as the leader and updates thc forwarding nodes of any dolotions (missing 
of an identiiier) or additions (with ncv identifier tags) in the ring header. Suitable ring 
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digest algorithm may be calculated and circulated to sll nodes by the leader alter the 
restoration phase. This new ring digest algorithm omits intermediate deleted nodes 
but adds new tag's corresponding to newer additions. Next, we discuss the operational 
protocol of the permutation ring. 
Depth-First Permutation Ring Transport Protocol: 
~ Summary: Each source S fragments and disperses the messages (through broad- 
cast) along a randomly chosen permutation ring that circulates to n participat- 
ing nodes A = Ar, As, . . . 
, 
A„and m intermediate (forwarding) nodes. All nodes 
relay message fragments to its immediate next hop in the logical ring. Number 
of fragmented messages are predetermined and distributed to all participating 
nodes before the distribution algorithm begins. 
~ Input: Message M that source wants to send, Shared group key K, 
~ Output: All n participating nodes with K able to decipher original message M. 
Algorithm Description at source S: 
1. Calculate complete message encipher Err(M). 
2. Fragment the enciphered message into P pieces, E(Err (M), n, m, P) = Gr, , Gr . 
3. Choose a random pernmtation pattern g, = Hrr, IIrs, . . . , IIs„ for Gl, Vj. 
Calculate a ring identifier digest that uniquely identifies the hop scqucncc 
R, = Hn(g, ), Vj. 
4. S ~ An, A j + Err(G, ), j = 1, 2, . . n. Here, S begins to unicast G, along P 
from the first hop An, , Vj. 
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5. S ~ Q: ACK(G, ). S awaits an acknowledgernent of Gr from Q, Vj. (S 
receives Gi from the last hop of Q, , acknowledging thc successful circulation 
for G, transmitted across g. ). 
6. Repeat steps 3, 4 and 5 for all the message fragments G, , 
Algorithm Description at receiving nodes A, (with permutation ring identifier 
1. Extract the ring digest Ai from the received packet and calculate 
P, = 11„, 11„, . . . , 11, „ 
2. For each received Gr, send a handshake acknowledgement to the previous hop 
for full handshaking transmission. 
3. Unicast the packet B, + Err(G, ) to the next hop entry An, , , Arh, ~ An, , +, '. 
Bj + Err(Gi). Repeat the transmission if no handshake acknowledgment is 
received after timeout. 
4. Node participating in shared group communication. If the number of fragments 
received matc:h the predetcrnuned size, an attempt is made to reorder and 
decrypt thc fragments using the shared group key: Drr(G, + Gz + . . + G„). 
Ordering and validity of message is verified by successful decryption of the 
complete message using the shared group key K. 
For a given source S and a set of participating nodes that the source uses for 
constructing a ring, the probability that Q of n (total) nodes become part of the ring ( 
is: Prob. (Q nodes out of n take part in ring grouping — Given source S) = I/ 
( Q 
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A coordinating set of eavesdropper nodes need to know the ring spaces (rings 
for all shares) transmitted and shared sequences after knowing K to be able to crack 
the messages. The degree of protection and hence the probability of continuous 
(successful) eavesdropping of P message fragments, given that the eavesdropper is 
not aware of all the participating nodes in a permutation ring communication for 
a specific source S is 1/[jn — 1)!] . Here we assume that S is a member of A, the 
communicating group. without having knowledge of thc nodes and the rings involved, 
the eavesdropper search complexity grows at a factorial order. If message-ordering 
complexity is taken into consideration after a continuous successful eavesdropping of 
all message fragments, then the overall probability is reduced even further. In this 
case, the probability of message cracking becomes I/((P!) * [(n — I)!]+). The total 
number of messages transmitted on the wire across the ring for a complete message 
M is proportional to the number of fragments P. If there are n participating nodes, 
the total number of messages forwarded across the ring becomes P * 2n. Each node 
receives a copy of the entire message fragment set but there are P *n message copies 
only across the ring, as required. 
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CHAPTER IV 
IMPLEMENTATIOLN AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
We designed and implemented an Anti-eavesdropping Multicast, Transporting Proto- 
col (AMTP) on BRICKServer Platform to prevent from network traffic analysis and 
sniffing for large distributed applications. This protocol is based on Depth-First, Ring 
protocol we introduced in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we first introduce 
our BrickServer platform and protocol run environment, then we give a description of 
AMTP implcmcntation detail, and finally, we use the networking monitoring software 
to sniff'er each node in order to verify the practical anti-eavesdropping efficiency of 
AMTP protocol. 
A. Why Use BrickServcr as thc AlvITP Run Platform 
BRICKServer [25] is based on a robust security model called Process-Based Security 
(PBS), which is implemented into the kernel of the linux operating system. PBS pre- 
vents unauthorized users (external or internal) or. programs from creating, modifying, 
or deleting system resources or data. 
Thc main different between tradition user-based OS and process based OS is that 
there is a central access control list to control the execution behavior of each program, 
and all system call that program use in process based OS. The Access Control List is 
the heart of PBS, which defines the permissions for accessing files and making system 
calls for each process. 
ACL example: 
I:EXECUTE /bin/anti-eavesdropping. exe SOCKETS 
2:ALLOWED-GROUPS everyone 
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Fig. 8. Secure-guaranteecl AMTP service in BrickServer architecture 
3:PATH /home/ DELETE 
4:PATH /lib/ READ 
5:END 
Code Explain: 
Line I:this is the full path to thc executable name, "SOCKETS" property (de- 
fined in following) is the only system call anti-eavesdropping. exe could usc. 
Some Program rights under PBS: 
REBOOT: reboot, or power off system 
SOCKETS: socket calls, excluding ioctl calls on a socket 
SETIO: I/O port control call 
CREATEFIFO: create FIFO special file with lnknod call 
USRSIGNAL; acrid signal to all processes for a given user. call 
SYSCTL: the sysctl call 
Line 2:you can restrict the ability to execute something by groups or users 
Line 3:this allows the program to delete from a user's home directory 
Linc 4:this gives the program power to link to its dynarriic libraries 
Line 5:end of definition 
AMTP is an applicatiori-level multi-cast, communication channel used to prevent 
from network traffic analysis and sniffing for large distributed applications. In order 
to prcvcnt from other existing or potential security holes (such as buffer overflow 
or root compromises etc)when running AIVITP, we loarl AVITIo module as another 
Distributed Application Layer 
)tn't: '"j'I. "6i' "up, Tr anap'tS 
, 
R;i„;"S:-"m""', ' "'' '"":"', "':", eaj;"' ""-""'l"@ll s, !r, lII jl 
I]II 
TCP/UDP 
Fig. 9. Anti-eavesdropping multicast transporting protocol architecture 
service similar like www and FTP in existing BrickServer as in Figure 8. Since any 
program running in BrickServer could effectively resist such security attacks, AMTP 
program running in BrickScrver also could resist potential security holes. 
B. Anti-eavesdropping Multicast Transporting Protocol (AMTP) Architecture 
1. Layered Design 
We use layered design for the whole protocol, each lower level layer provides the 
communication primitive for its upper level layer, and each layer is an independent 
module. The lowest layer is networking socket module provided by the operating 
system, then from down to up, thc second layer is ring-based multicast communication 
primitive(read/write), the third layer is for multicast file/data transport layer based 
on the second one, and thc fourth layer is the distributed application layer that makes 
all the application traffic resist traffic analysis through calling its low level transport 
primitive(Figure 9). 
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Fig. 10. Anti-eavesdropping multicast ring protocol payload format 
2. Uniform Traflic and Digital Signature to Guarantee Anonymity 
Other than resisting the traffic analysis(communication anonymity), our AMTP is 
also a guarantee sender/ receiver anonymity through adding encryption layer on the 
transport layer. The behavior of each node in the ring is only forwarding the re- 
ceived packet to the next node(UDP forwarding), and the actual traffic patten in 
each node is uniform and symmetric(See Figure 10). When a node wants to send 
some data for some specific receivers in the ring, he only needs encrypt the data us- 
ing the public key of each receivers. When the data is delivered to each node using 
our anti-eavesdropping multicast transport protocol, each node in the ring will re- 
ceive the encrypted data, however, only the receivers designated by the sender could 
decrypt the encryption data using their private keys respectively. In this process, 
each receiver couldn't figure out who really sent this data. Thus, sender anonymity is 
guaranteed. As for receiver anonymity, each rrmlticast communication could satisfy 
such requirement since the sender couldn' t, figure out who would be really interested 
in thc multicast message even through each node in the ring did receive his message. 
3. Total Ordering and Atomic Multicast Communication to Support E-Transaction 
All current group transaction systems have an important requirement for thc low 
level rnulticast communication: atomic, total ordering. AMTP supports a pub- 
lish/subscribe paradigm, and implements ai, omic, totally ordered, group communica- 
tion. The "atomic" means the property of all or nothing. If a process that multicasts 
a message crashes before it has delivered it, 
, 
then it is possible that thc message will 
not be delivered to any process in the group; but if it is delivered to some correct 
process, then all other correct processes will deliver it. Total ordering means that if a 
correct process delivers message m before it delivers n, then any other correct process 
that delivers n will deliver m before n. 
Our total ordering algorithm relies on an arrangement of members in a logical 
ring (26]. When a member sends a message, that message is sent around the ring. 
Each member receives it, and forwards it to the next member in the ring. As the 
message travels around the ring, it carries the largest timestamp (a sequence number) 
of the members it traversed. When the message returns to the sender, the latter knows 
that everybody has received the message. It then sends a commit message with the 
largest timestamp that the message encountered on its first trip around the ring. As 
the members receive commit mcssagcs, they deliver the message to the application 
in increasing timestamp order. Because every message is comnaittcd according to a 
globally unique timestarnp (every commit message carries the largest timestamp from 
all the members), the totally-order can bc achieved. 
To achieve an atomic communication, we considered the following situations: 
(I) Some node misses the data message. The sender of the message can detect 
such event. After a time period if it does not receive the returned message it sends 
bcforc, it will send the message again. If it will retransmission this for R times every 
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T time period until it receives the rcturncd message. In this thesis we assumed that 
each node cannot fail and communication link never fails, so the message vill be 
received by thc node at lost after some retrsnsmission. 
(2) Some node misses the commit message. Then it cannot be returned to the 
sender. The same as above, after some time period, the sender will retransmit the 
commit message until it receives the returned commit message. In this sense, the 
returned message to the sender can be viewed as a Acknowledgement Message. 
These will ensure that all nodes in the group will deliver the message or not. 
4. Member Management in the Ring 
We use a double link list to maintain the logic ring. Each node in the ring only need 
remember the information of its neighbor nodes. We also set up a registry server 
to record the information in each ring. When a ring is created with one ring ID, 
the process created the ring will use UDP to connect the registry server to register 
such Ring ID. If the ring ID exists already, this node is then "inserted" into the 
existed 'logical ring", And the registry will only keep both neighbor nodes of the 
header in the ring. The header is commonly the first node that join (create) this ring. 
Then new member can join into the ring, it will be simply "inserted" into the existed 
"logical ring" by modifying the links information the others node keep. The existed 
member can leave this ring anytime. If it is not the "header" of the "ring" whose 
information is kept in the registry, only modifying thc links information(pointer to 
neighbor nodes) can maintain the "logical ring", otherwise, we will also need modify 
the header's information for thc ring in the registry. 
stream-control 
p og a 1's s die 
stream-data 
Fig. 11. Emcast interfact with ring handler 
5. Uniform Multicast Communication Interface 
We imbedded our totally ordering ring protocol into the emcast toolkit [27]. Emcast 
is a multicast toolkit for distributed/peer-to-peer applications that require multicast 
communication. It includes the program "emcast", a generic multicast utility (like 
netcat), and thc library "libemcast", a gcncric multicast library. Emcast supports 
IPv4 multicast (IM) and can easily support almost any end-host rnulticast (EM) 
protocol. The emcast protocols supported are STAR (centralized TCP), Banana 
Tree Protocol (BTP), and Internet Chat Relay (IRC). Now it also supports our Ring 
protocol. 
A program is compiled with hbemcast. Libemcast communicates with an emcasi. 
handler using the emcast protocol over two streams, the control stream and the data 
stream. Thc control stream is two-way and the data stream is onc-way from handler 
to libemcast. Sce the diagram below. For example, the handler might be a child 
process, ihe control stream txvo pipes, and thc data stream a FIFO. 
Libemcast scads requests and receives responses from the handler using the con- 
trol stream. The handler sends requests using, thc data stream. The handler can 
not rcccive responses using the data stream. If only one stream werc used and both 
libemcast and the handler seni a request, each would think the other's rcqucst was a 
29 
response to its own request, and a malfunction may occur. Using two streams seems 
the best solution. Here, wc wrote our own ring handler in order to interact with 
emcast. 
Usage Example: 
l. emcast 234. 43. 13. 42:8765 
(emcast joins a IPv4 multicast group) 
2. emcast "btp://junglemonkey. net/Monkey Central" 
(emcast joins "Monkey Central" on junglemonkey. net using BTP) 
3. emcast "ring://dasher. cs. tamu. edu:5000" 
(emcast joins our multicast ring channel with id 5000) 
C. Experiment and Cost Analysis 
1. Testbed Introduction 
In a local arcs network, we use four BrickServers to simulate the real environment of 
distributed application hosts located in thc v:hole Intcrnct. The diffcrencc between 
these two environments to our test, result is the packet transmission delay of each 
forwarding operation in thc protocol. And our objective is to make traffic of each 
individual node symmetric. And we also make thc communication protocol atomic, 
v. hich means the traffic of each nodes could be still keep symmetric even packet lost 
existed in real networking. We assume the attacker could sniff the inbound snd 
outbound of TCP/UDP traffic of each individual node in rcaltimc. 
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2. Traffic Masking and Cost Analysis 
In the whole logical ring, only one node(Node I) sends messages and the other nodes 
receive messages. In the following four charts Figure 12, we could find thc traffic of 
each node always remains constant in any time interval. It is very difficult for the 
attacker to find the matching of the sender and receiver in such multicast communi- 
cation based ring protocol, The real traffic pattern reaches uniform snd symmetric in 
each node through AhfTP. However, in the Figure 13, through monitoring the trafiic 
in each node, it is easy for eavesdropper to find thc real sender and receiver in the 
common broadcast communication. 
Cost Analysis 
Running Cost Analysis: In asyiichronous message passing system, we assume 
that the maximum message delay in any execution is one unit of time and then calcu- 
late the running time until termination. Then the time complexity of an asynchronous 
algorithm is the maximum time until termination among all timed admissible execu- 
tion in which every message delay is at most one. 
For the general broadcast system, the time complexity to deliver a unit message 
is O(1), and for our AlvITP protocol, the time complexity to deliver a message is 
O(n*m), since each sliced message from original mcssagc will circle around thc ring. 
For Breadth-First Protocol, the time complexity to deliver a message is O(m w h). 
Here, n is the number of nodes in the group, and m the number of sliced message 
from original message, h is thc number of middle hops each sliced rriessage will go 
through before it finally reaches the designated node. 
Bufiering Cost Analysis: 1Ve assume that the maximum buff'ering cost in any 
execution is the total memory buffers used to store and operate one unit of message 
in all distributed processors. For the general broadcast, system, the buffer cost com- 
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plexity to deliver a unit message is O(1), and for our AMTP protocol, the buffering 
cost complexity to deliver a message is O(n), since each sliced message from original 
message will circle around the ring, and each node in thc ring will store each sliced 
message. For Breadth-First Protocol, the buffering cost complexity to deliver a unit 
message is O(n a h). Since each sliced message will be stored temporarily in the 
middle hops. Here, n is the number of nodes in the group, and m the number of 
sliced message from original message, fr is the number of middle hops that each sliced 
message will go through before it finally reaches the designated node. We could found 
the buffering cost is independent of m, the total number of sliced message from an 
original unit message. 
Ordering Cost Analysis: We assume that the maximum ordering cost in any 
execution is the total operations to recover the original message in the receiver side. 
For the general broadcast system, the ordering cost complexity to recover a unit 
message is O(1), since the message ordering is implemented by low level transport 
protocol, and for our AMTP protocol, the ordering cost to deliver a message is O(m), 
this result is also applied to the Breadth-First Protocol; since in either case, the total 
m sliced message will be collected in the receiver side in order to get the original 
message. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this thesis, we proposed traffic-concealing, anti-eavesdropping communication pro- 
tocols for secure group communications. By using shared secrets and digital sig- 
natures, our scheme need not exchange keys over the network explicitly for data 
encryption. By using simple shufffing and ordering of message fragments, we disperse 
the interaction communication patterns among the multicast participants to counter 
eavesdropping and traffic analysis attacks. The two different types of broadcast- 
based data transport primitives have been proposed to meet different performance 
and security requirements. In contrasting the two approaches, the two-hop relay 
communication may result in a less uniform traffic pattern than the permutation ring 
approach, but it takes less time to deliver a message. On the other hand, all nodes 
on the permutation ring would receive the fragmented packets, making it easier for 
eavesdroppers to acquire complete, yet encrypted messages. Of course, to crack the 
message, one still must have full knowledge about the permutation and shuffiing rules. 
It takes much more for an eavesdropper to acquire the full messages in the two-hop re- 
lay process, as it requires all nodes to be compromised before making intelligible sense 
of the message. It is of great interest to further expand different types of transport 
primitives to conceal traffic patterns of group communications. 
AMTP provides a very good traffic-concealing, anonymous multicast communica- 
tion channel for the upper level distributed applications, such as distributed storage 
system, e-transaction system, or e-vote system. Since AMTP is application-level 
multicast protocol, it will not rely on any current low level Internet multicast infras- 
tructure. 
Although our AMTP communication channel could make the total application 
traffic uniform in each node in different time phases, it is still possible to detect 
the non-uniform signal pattern in the physical layer. Even for any message sender 
or receiver, the packet sending rate and receiving rate were not controlled to reach 
some concealing pattern. Furthermore, in dynamic network environment, due to the 
traffic congestion in special situation, there should be some non-uniform characteristic 
between the nodes, which are near the sending node, and the nodes, which are fsr 
from the sending node. Additionally, it is possible for some node in multiple ring at 
the same time. Is it possible to use control theory to manage such traffic patten in the 
whole picture'? Also, the factor of performance and security are always a tradeoff in 
design such scheme. All of these factors should be considered carefully in our future 
work. 
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